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Abstract We analysed the association between economic incentives and diagnostic cod-
ing practice in the Norwegian public health care system. Data included 3,180,578 hospital
discharges in Norway covering the period 1999–2008. For reimbursement purposes, all dis-
charges are grouped in diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). We examined pairs of DRGs where
the addition of one or more specific diagnoses places the patient in a complicated rather than
an uncomplicated group, yielding higher reimbursement. The economic incentive was mea-
sured as the potential gain in income by coding a patient as complicated, and we analysed the
association between this gain and the share of complicated discharges within the DRG pairs.
Using multilevel linear regression modelling, we estimated both differences between hospi-
tals for each DRG pair and changes within hospitals for each DRG pair over time. Over the
whole period, a one-DRG-point difference in price was associated with an increased share of
complicated discharges of 14.2 (95% confidence interval [CI] 11.2–17.2) percentage points.
However, a one-DRG-point change in prices between years was only associated with a 0.4
(95% CI −1.1 to 1.8) percentage point change of discharges into the most complicated diag-
nostic category. Although there was a strong increase in complicated discharges over time,
this was not as closely related to price changes as expected.
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Introduction
A number of countries have introduced activity-based payment systems for hospital care by
linking all or part of the hospital budget to the number of discharged patients while at the same
time adjusting for treatment intensity or patient complexity (case mix). The diagnosis-related
group (DRG) is one of the most common systems used to account for case mix. DRGs are
widely used for bothmonitoring and payment purposes. The size of the reimbursement differs
between patients, reflecting differences in complexity and thus treatment costs. Patients are
categorized in different groups based on diagnosis and procedural codes routinely registered
in medical records. For some groups, the DRG system makes the distinction between a
“complicated” and an “uncomplicated” patient. While the main diagnosis will be the same,
complicated patients will have one or more additional “complicating” secondary diagnoses.
Within the resulting pair of DRGs, the complicated group will thus have higher predicted
costs and a higher reimbursement. Because personnel in hospitals register information about
diagnosis, there is the possibility that a patient is consciously coded to a “complicated”
DRG. This is often referred to as “upcoding” or “DRG creep”, first defined as “a deliberate
and systematic shift in a hospital’s reported case mix in order to improve reimbursement”
(Simborg 1981). It has also been argued that the introduction of activity-based payment
systems will increase the importance of accuracy and completeness in coding (Fisher et al.
1992; O’Reilly et al. 2012). The latter view is shared by the Norwegian government body
responsible for the Norwegian DRG system, which defines DRG creep as “patients being
coded as more complete, resulting in an increase in case mix index” (translated by the authors
from Helsedirektoratet (2011)). Indeed, evidence from the US Medicare system indicated
that the introduction of a prospective payment system in 1983 was followed by an increase
in the average case mix (Carter and Ginsburg 1985; Ellis and McGuire 1986; Carter et al.
1990; Stern and Epstein 1985; Rosenberg 2001).
In the past decade, there has been a renewed interest in issues related to DRG creep
and upcoding. Examining a policy reform in the financing of US Medicare discharges,
(Dafny 2005) found a positive association between price differences between complicated
and uncomplicated DRGs and the share of discharges in complicated groups. More recently,
Barros and Braun (2016) found a positive association between price incentives and upcoding
in Portugal.
Responses to price incentives vary between different types of hospitals. In Sweden, the
increase in the number of secondary diagnoses registeredwas larger in hospitalswith prospec-
tive payment systems than hospitals without prospective payment systems (Serdén et al.
2003). Two studies in the USA found that for-profit hospitals were more likely than non-
profit or government-owned hospitals to upcode (Dafny and Dranove 2009; Silverman and
Skinner 2004), and also that hospitals in “economic distress” weremore likely to upcode (Sil-
verman and Skinner 2004). However, no difference in upcoding between public and private
hospitals was found in Italy (Berta et al. 2010).
In a cross-country comparative study, Steinbusch et al. suggest that health systems com-
bining for-profit hospitals with the use of secondary diagnosis criteria for classification, such
as in the USA, were more susceptible to upcoding (Steinbusch et al. 2007). In a system-
atic review, Palmer et al. argued that the effects seen in other countries are similar to those
observed in the US system (Palmer et al. 2014). In a theoretical work, Kuhn and Siciliani
suggested that the level of auditing of the financing system will influence the perceived risk
related to upcoding, and this can also explain differences in levels of upcoding across health
systems (Kuhn and Siciliani 2008).
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The purpose of this paper is to add to the relatively small literature on upcoding in systems
dominated by public hospitals by providing an analysis of coding behaviour in Norway over a
period of 10 years. The Norwegian health care system is tax funded, with universal access to
services that are largely free at the point of use. Hospitals are predominantly publicly owned
and financed through a combination of global budgets and activity-based funding. Activity-
based financing was introduced in 1997 utilizing a Nordic version of the DRG system. In
the period covered by this study (1999–2008), the share of activity-based funding fluctuated
between 40 and 60%.1 The period also encompasses a major ownership reform in 2002,
where hospital ownership was transferred from 19 county councils to the state (Magnussen
et al. 2007).
Analysing coding behaviour in the Norwegian health care sector allowed us to address
three questions. First, in a public health care system, the additional income generated from
upcoding remains in the hospital. Thus, it will be used to increase the level of activity beyond
what was planned, to increase slack (inefficiencies), or it will be saved to finance future
investments. It remains uncertain to what extent actors in this public setting will seek to
increase income by upcoding. Second, the substantial changes in the degree of activity-based
funding during the period studied allowed us to analyse to what extent public hospitals
adjust their coding behaviour in response to changes in financial incentives. Third, using
observations over a period of 10 years allowed us to study any underlying trends in coding
behaviour, and isolate this from the effects of changes in financial incentives. In all three
questions, our main interest was the potential relationship between economic incentives and
coding behaviour on an aggregate national level. Although there are numerous micro-level
examples of upcoding (Lægreid and Neby 2012; Neby et al. 2015), it is unclear whether




Data from all Norwegian somatic hospital discharges for the period 1999–2008 were used.
The Norwegian Patient Registry provided the data.2 Each hospital discharge was grouped in
a DRG, and 250 of the total of 913 groups were linked in complicated/uncomplicated pairs
(in 2008). Only patients in acute care hospitals grouped within these 125 DRG pairs were
included. We excluded DRG pairs not used in all years, DRG pairs with fewer than 1000
annual cases, and five additionalDRGpairs thatwere viewed as problematic.3 After exclusion
criteria were applied, 3,180,578 in-patient discharges remained. They were grouped into 76
different DRG pairs, of which 53 pairs were medical DRGs and 23 pairs were surgical DRGs.
1 In 1999–2001, the share of income related to activity was 50%, increasing to 55% in 2002 and 60% in
2003. The share fell to 40% in 2004, and rose again to 60% in 2005. The share returned to 40% in the years
2006–2008.
2 The Norwegian Patient Register is a complete registry of all specialized hospital care. The interpretation
and reporting of these data are the sole responsibility of the authors, and no endorsement by the Norwegian
Patient Register is intended nor should be inferred.
3 These five excluded DRGs were 372/373 (Vaginal births), 76/77 (Other respiratory operating room pro-
cedures), 452A/453A (Complications of treatment with surgery), 454/455 (Other injury, poisoning & toxic
effect) and 478/479 (Other vascular procedures). Among these DRG pairs, vaginal births was the largest of
all complicated/uncomplicated pairs, and was excluded due to significant alterations in the specifications of
the DRG pair during the period.
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These pairs amount to about 29% of the total volume of discharges. See Table 1 for a list of
included DRG pairs. Our study included 26 hospitals (including three large publicly funded
non-profit private hospitals). Not all hospitals treated patients in all included DRGs.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable (ctih) was the percentage of complicated discharges in a DRG pair.
This was defined as the number of complicated cases divided by the total number of cases in
the DRG pair, calculated for year t , DRG pair i and hospital h.
Potential gain in income from upcoding: the incentive
Wemeasured the potential gain in income from upcoding as the difference in reimbursement
(DRG prices) between complicated and uncomplicated groups in each DRG pair similarly to
the spread in weights as defined by Dafny (2005) and Barros et.al. (Barros and Braun 2016).
This spread did not differ across hospitals, as there were no hospital-specific prices. We
calculated the difference between prices of complicated and uncomplicated groups within a
DRG pair across the years, multiplied by the share of activity-based funding for each specific
year. However, we depart from Dafny’s approach by calculating the mean across years for
eachDRGpair and denote this as pi (Eq. 1). To enable comparison across years, wemeasured
prices normalized in DRG points, not as the monetary value of a DRG point. One DRG point,
roughly equalling the treatment cost of the “average patient”, was valued at 33,647 NOK
(∼3629 EUR) in 2008. This should be interpreted as the incentive in a DRG pair because it










In Eq. 1, COMPLICATEDit is the DRG weight (relative price) of the complicated group in
DRG pair i in year t , UNCOMPLICATEDit is the DRG weight of the uncomplicated group
in DRG pair i in year t and ABFSHAREt is the share of the total budget allocated through
activity-based financing (from 0 to 1) in year t .
However, the price of each DRG may change from year to year. Such changes are caused
by (1) changes in relative reimbursement rates (prices are adjusted annually) for specific
DRGs (i.e., COMPLICATEDit and UNCOMPLICATEDit ), and (2) variations in the share
of activity-based funding between years (ABFSHAREt ). Either of these causes will yield
changes in the potential gain in income. In this study, we are not only interested in the level
of the incentive, (pi ), but also in changes calculated as the annual changes from the average








By separating pi and pit , we separate the effect of the level of the incentive from changes
in the incentive on coding behaviour. The level of the incentive is thus the difference between
DRG pairs (pi ), while the changes are differences over time within a specific DRG pair
(pit ). The spread used by Dafny (2005) and Barros et.al. (Barros and Braun 2016) is the
sum of these between and within effects.
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Statistical analysis
The clustered and hierarchical nature of the data led us towards a mixed-model approach.
Themultivariable analyseswere performed using a three-level linear regressionmodel, where
hospital discharges were aggregated to 19,250 observations, comprising 10 yearly observa-
tions (level 1) of each DRG pair (level 2) within each of the 26 hospitals (level 3). Equation
3 describes our main analytical model.
ctih = a + ai + ah + b1 pi + b2Δpit + b3Tt + b4D + b5Tt D + bx xtih + εtih (3)
Our dependent variable, ctih , is the share of complicated cases in year t in DRG pair i in
hospital h. The effects of the level of the upcoding incentive were defined by pi (Eq. 1),
and the change in incentive defined by pit (Eq. 2). To capture any general development in
coding practice over time, we included time trend (Tt ), which measures years since 1999.
This time trend might, however, capture both general improvements in quality of coding, as
well as any fraudulent upcoding not captured by the effects of pi andpit .We also controlled
(by way of a dummy (D) for the years 2002–2008) for the possible effect of the ownership
reform in 2002. A statistical interaction of these was included (Tt D).
The a-terms are constants and intercepts at the different levels while εtih is the residual.
Other covariates are denoted xtih in the equation. These included average age and sex in
each DRG pair. Elderly patients are more likely to be frailer, and therefore have an increased
probability of beinggrouped in complicatedgroups.4 For the same reason,wealso adjusted for
emergency status and length of stay. Emergency admissions aremore likely to be complicated
than elective procedures (Melnick et al. 1989; Keller et al. 1987). Length of stay may be a
proxy for case mix as the longer the patient remains in the hospital, the more complex the
illness is likely to be or the frailer the patient. To better control for co-morbidity and case mix,
we constructed a Charlson index for each analytical observation. The index is a measure of
co-morbidity that is based upon secondary diagnoses (Charlson et al. 1987), as also was our
dependent variable. For the calculation of the Charlson index, we excluded those diagnoses
that caused a complicated DRG grouping (within each DRG pair), and thus the index does
not have an upcoding bias other than what comes from the complicated discharges actually
being more complicated.
While ownership of hospitals after 2002 was transferred to the state, there was an admin-
istrative decentralization to four regional health authorities. The regional health authorities
face different challenges, as there are substantial differences in distance to hospital, different
degrees of deficits/surpluses and also size of population. We also included dummy variables
for these to account for possible regional variances in coding behaviour induced by diverse
organizational incentives or structures. The annual number of in-patient treatments at each
hospital (measured as case mix-adjusted DRG points) was included as a proxy for hospital
size. This measure will be invariant at the DRG pair level. Finally, we performed a stratified
analysis of medical and surgical DRGs, because surgical DRGs could arguably have less
room for differences in coding behaviour than medical DRGs. Precision was estimated with
95% confidence intervals (CI).
Even though the dependent variable is a proportion, we assumed normality in the residuals.
Robustness tests were performed with a simpler two-level model, using the actual monetary
value as main independent variables instead of the rather abstract DRG points.
4 In the regressions, we control for age by restricted cubic splines, calculated with five knots (Harrell 2001).
Five knots means that the age range is split in five groups. These splines provide a better control and fit of
variables than a simple linear approach. However, the resulting coefficients are not readily interpretable as
they are not marginal linear effects.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for variables in analysis
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 55.57 58.16 1.59 1.00 98.00
Percentage female 51.19 49.70 21.09 0.00 100.00
Percentage emergency 70.75 81.24 29.16 0.00 100.00
Length of stay 4.87 4.10 3.10 0.00 46.00
Number of inpatient treatments at hospital* 11,496 8959 8383 1812 43,540
Percentage medical DRGs 70.20 100.00 45.73 0.00 100.00
Charlson co-morbidity index 0.26 0.18 0.33 0.00 8.00
Potential gain in income pi 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.05 1.19
Changes in potential gain in income pit 0.00 −0.00 0.09 −0.33 0.52
Percentage complicated discharges (ctih) 38.01 35.30 20.94 0.00 100.00
N =19,250

















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage complicated in DRG pair
Fig. 1 Distribution of percentage complicated in DRG pair, histogram
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Across the observations (year, DRG pair, hospital),
the mean share of complicated discharges was 38%, ranging from 0 to 100 (see Fig. 1 for
distribution). The mean pi was 0.28 DRG points and ranged from 0.05 to 1.19 (see Fig. 2 for
distribution). Themean change (pit ) was zero because this was defined as yearly deviations
from pi . Table 1 lists pi and the mean absolute pit for each DRG pair, and Fig. 3 shows
the distribution of pit .
Data analysis was performed at an aggregate level, i.e., the mean age of 55.6 was the mean
across all observations (year, DRG pair, hospital) and not the mean for all distinct patients.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of changes in potential gain in income pit, histogram
On average, the share of females was 51.2%, but this varied from 0 to 100 as some DRG
pairs were gender specific. The mean length of stay was 4.87, but varied across DRG pairs
with a maximum of 46. Some DRG pairs had a zero length of stay and were thus likely to be
patients admitted as in-patients but discharged on the same day. There was a downward trend
in length of stay over the period. To control for hospital size, we also calculated the (case
mix-adjusted) number of in-patient discharges at each hospital. This was measured annually
at the hospital level, and as opposed to the other independent variables, this was DRG pair
invariant. Hospital size varied substantially with the mean of 11,496 discharges while the
largest hospital had 43,540 discharges. Mean hospital size also increased over the period
covered by this study, both through reforms and reorganizations/mergers as well as increased
budgets. All control variables were centred on their mean in the multivariable analysis.
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Multivariable analysis
Table 3 shows the correlations between the variables of interest. The share of complicated
discharges (ctih) was highly correlated with the case mix-related variables: age (Pearson’s r
correlation coefficient 0.512), length of stay (0.461) and comorbidity (0.510). The share of
complicated dischargeswas also positively correlatedwith the temporal variables, emergency
admissions and medical DRG pairs. At this aggregate level, there was a small yet statistically
significant association with pi (0.091), but not with pit .
In the multilevel regressions, there was a positive association between pi and the share of
complicated discharges (Table 4). Over the whole period, a one-DRG-point difference in pi
was associated with an increased share of complicated discharges of 14.2 percentage points
(95% CI 11.2–17.2). However, a one-DRG-point change in pit between years was only
associated with an increase of the most complicated group of 0.4 percentage points (95% CI
−1.1 to 1.8).
The temporal variables had large estimated values. There was a large annual increase in
the share of complicated discharges of 2.9 percentage points (95% CI 2.6–3.1) in the period
leading up to the reform (1999–2001). After the reform in 2002, there was a shift in the share
of complicated discharges of 10.2 percentage points (95% CI 9.6–10.8). By calculating the
combined estimates of Tt , D and Tt D, we find an annual increase of only 0.4 percentage
points in the period after 2002.
The case-mix adjustors had a large impact on the share of complicated discharges. A
one-unit increase in the Charlson index, which can be interpreted as one more co-morbidity,
was associated with an increase of 12.5 percentage points in the share of complicated dis-
charges. For an increase inmean length of stay of one day, the share of complicated discharges
increased 1.3 percentage points (95% CI 1.2–1.4). We found only a small negative associ-
ation between share of females and percentage of complicated discharges. There were no
substantial differences between the different regional health authorities. Hospital size had
a small positive effect, indicating that larger hospitals have a higher share of complicated
discharges.
The share of complicated discharges was 8.1 percentage points (95%CI 6.8–9.4) higher in
medical DRG pairs than in surgical DRG pairs. We performed a stratified analysis of medical
and surgical DRG pairs. For medical pairs, a one-DRG-point change in pit was associated
with an increase in share of complicated discharges of 5.1 percentage points (95% CI 2.5–
7.6) (Table 4); for the surgical DRG pairs, there was a negative effect from pit of −2.5
(95% CI −4.3 to −0.6). Aside from the effect of pit , there were no other large differences
between the stratified and the non-stratified analyses.
Robustness tests were performed using simpler two-level models (either hospital level or
DRG pair level), but the results did not differ much from the results presented in Table 4.
We also ran the analysis using potential income gain measures calculated from the monetary
refund that the hospitals received instead of DRG points. The refund was calculated using the
yearly refund value of a DRG point while deflating the older years to real 2008 prices. The
results did not differ much from the presented results. The test showed that for every 1000
NOK (∼109 EUR) in increased potential income (pi ), the share of complicated discharges
increased by 0.31 percentage points. Nonetheless, changes in pit had no effect. Table 5
shows the different models tested for robustness.
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Discussion
Our goal was to examine the association between the potential gain in income from upcoding
and the coding behaviour of hospitals. Across DRG pairs, we found a positive association
between the gain in income from upcoding and the share of discharges classified as compli-
cated. Thus, DRG pairs in which there was a higher gain in income from upcoding also had a
higher share of complicated discharges. However, although we controlled for co-morbidity,
age and length of stay, we cannot exclude the possibility that this partly reflects differences
in the case mix. Nevertheless, it is not clear why the difference in treatment costs between
complicated and uncomplicated discharges should be higher in DRG pairs with a higher
share of complicated discharges and therefore our results indicate that coding behaviour is
related to the size of the incentive.
We found that a difference in price between a complicated and uncomplicated group of
one DRG point was related to a difference of 14 percentage points in the share of complicated
dischargeswithin aDRGpair.Although thismay seem like a large effect, the average potential
gain from upcoding was only 0.28 DRG points (see Table 2).
We found no association between changes in pit over time and the share of compli-
cated discharges within a DRG pair. Thus, in a period with frequent changes in the share of
activity-based funding, hospitals did not seem to respond by changing their coding behav-
iour. However, when stratifying the analysis by medical and surgical DRGs, we found a
small, positive association for medical DRGs. Because surgical patients are generally more
homogeneous (within a DRG) than medical patients, there may have been less opportunity
for tactical coding of these patients. Although the size of the estimated association was small,
this result indicated that there might be subgroups of patients where the relationship between
financial incentives and tactical coding is stronger. This corresponds to earlier results on how
Norwegian hospitals respond to price changes (Januleviciute et al. 2016). Melberg et al. have
recently shown higher growth in DRG groups with a price increase than in groups with a
reduction in reimbursement rates (Melberg et al. 2016).
We found that the share of complicated discharges increased during the ten year period
covered by the study. This may be due to changes in case mix resulting from demographic
changes, changes in technology, changes in the quality and completeness of coding and
finally changes in the financing system. Recalling the two different definitions of upcoding
and DRG creep presented in the introduction, we cannot here distinguish between “deliberate
upcoding” and “more complete coding”. The increasing trend could both indicate that the
quality of coding has improved, and at the same time that the presence of explicit and
implicit incentives is followed by a general increase in the recording of secondary diagnoses.
Thus, while we cannot label all upcoding as being completely driven by financial incentives,
we argue that such incentives were present and that their consequences are reflected on
an aggregate level by the increasing time trend. The introduction of activity-based funding
in 1997 was followed by an increased use of secondary diagnoses. Eventually the use of
secondary diagnoses will reach a level (or equilibrium) where it might be difficult to justify
an additional secondary diagnosis from a medical point of view. Thus, one might suspect that
a large part of the potential for increase was exhausted in the period following the hospital
reform, explaining the slowing growth in the share of complicated discharges.
This paper decomposed the price incentive into two components, pi andpit , to differen-
tiate between the level and changes of the incentive for upcoding. This approach differs from
earlier studies but demonstrates that, in Norway, the differences in prices are more important
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than changes within groups. Hospitals may appear to respond to prices, but the changes in
price are probably too small to have a large-scale impact.
We believe that the major strength of this analysis is the fact that we are able to utilize a
complete dataset covering all DRG pairs for all patients at all hospitals. Our analyses include
a ten year period in which there have been large and repeated changes in the potential gain
in income from upcoding. Thus, any aggregate effects of increased gain in income from
upcoding should be detected in this study. By controlling for a time trend and separating
within and between effects, we are more reassured that any remaining effects are more
related to upcoding rather than to an increase in the quality of coding.
We have employed a system perspective by pooling all DRG pairs, hospitals and years in
the same analysis. This could dilute important findings for specific DRG pairs. Silverman and
Skinner (2004) found substantial evidence of upcoding for patients with pneumonia. Their
results were robust to different model specifications, but sensitive to the included DRGs.
Our stratification showed very different results for the medical and surgical DRG pairs. It is
safe to assume that even larger differences will be found on examination of separate DRGs.
However, our aim was to detect system-level effects and not effects of singular groups or
hospitals. One might also question whether the observed changes in the price incentive were
large enough to have an effect. While frequent and potentially substantial, the changes in
incentives observed in this study were small compared with some of the larger exogenous
shocks described by, for example, Dafny (2005). Therefore, it may have been unrealistic to
expect significant results from the observed changes. A change of 20 percentage points in the
share of activity-based funding is, however, not trivial and it is interesting that these changes
only seem to have led to a marginal change in coding practice.
Upcoding can take place in all systems that incentivize documenting of diagnoses. We
have limited our study to upcoding in DRG pairs in Norway. These groups amount to less
than one-third of the total volume of treatment. Upcoding is possible for all groups, but the
paired structure of complicated/uncomplicated lends itself easily to our research strategy
of testing directly whether incentives are associated with upcoding. There are several ways
“manipulations” can occur in a DRG system (Neby et al. 2015). In this paper, we have
focused solely on upcoding and not touched upon other related strategies: gaming, dumping,
skimping and skimming. Further studies should attempt to distinguish upcoding from other
manipulations empirically. It is impossible using registry data to determine whether the
upcoding has been deliberate. To assess the actual conscious decision to upcode, one must
opt for a qualitative approach. This study has not ventured into the auditing of diagnosis and
hospital records. Earlier evidence from Norway has indicated that diagnostic accuracy is not
very high (Jørgenvåg 2005), and it would be interesting to consider whether the Norwegian
auditing scheme could be considered optimal (Kuhn and Siciliani 2008).
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